382
Souter, J., dissenting
it is a central theme of our jurisprudence that the entire electorate, which necessarily includes the members of the major parties, will benefit from robust competition in ideas and governmental policies that " 'is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.' " Anderson, 460 U. S., at 802, quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., at 32.
In my opinion legislation that would otherwise be unconstitutional because it burdens First Amendment interests and discriminates against minor political parties cannot survive simply because it benefits the two major parties. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Souter, dissenting.
I join Parts I and II of Justice Stevens's dissent, agreeing as I do that none of the concerns advanced by the State suffices to justify the burden of the challenged statutes on respondent's First Amendment interests. I also agree with Justice Stevens's view, set out in the first paragraph of Part III, that the State does not assert the interest in preserving "the traditional two-party system" upon which the majority repeatedly relies in upholding Minnesota's statutes, see, e. g., ante, at 367 ("The Constitution permits the Minnesota Legislature to decide that political stability is best served through a healthy two-party system"). Actually, Minnesota's statement of the "important regulatory concerns advanced by the State's ban on ballot fusion," Brief for Petitioners 40, contains no reference whatsoever to the "two-party system," nor even any explicit reference to "political stability" generally. See id., at 40-50.
To be sure, the State does assert its intention to prevent "party splintering," id., at 46-50, which may not be separable in the abstract from a desire to preserve political stabil-
Page: Index Previous 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007