464
Opinion of the Court
the time Johnson claimed he had given her mother the box full of cash.
At the close of Johnson's trial, and in accordance with then-extant Circuit precedent, see, e. g., United States v. Molinares, 700 F. 2d 647, 653 (CA11 1983), the District Judge instructed the jury that the element of materiality was a question for the judge to decide, and that he had determined that her statements were material. App. 72. Johnson did not object to this instruction. Indeed, when the prosecution had presented evidence concerning materiality during the trial, she had then objected, on the ground that materiality was a matter for the judge, and not the jury, to decide. Id., at 61. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Johnson was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment, three years' supervised release, and a $30,000 fine.
After Johnson was convicted, but before her appeal to the Court of Appeals, we decided United States v. Gaudin, supra, which held that the materiality of a false statement must be submitted to the jury rather than decided by the trial judge. On her appeal, Johnson argued that the trial judge's failure to submit materiality to the jury rendered her conviction invalid under Gaudin.
Because Johnson had failed to object to the trial judge's deciding materiality, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed for plain error. Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
Following our analysis in United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725 (1993), the Court of Appeals assumed, arguendo, that the District Court's failure to submit materiality to the jury constituted "error" that was "clear or obvious," but concluded nonetheless that any such error did not affect the "substantial rights" of the defendant. That conclusion was
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