Cite as: 520 U. S. 461 (1997)
Opinion of the Court
rect an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) "error," (2) that is "plain," and (3) that "affect[s] substantial rights." 507 U. S., at 732. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error " ' "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." ' " Ibid. (quoting United States v. Young, supra, at 15, in turn quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U. S. 157, 160 (1936)).
A
There is no doubt that if petitioner's trial occurred today, the failure to submit materiality to the jury would be error under Gaudin. Under Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987), a "new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . pending on direct review . . . , with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." Id., at 328. Because petitioner is still on direct review, Griffith requires that we apply Gaudin retroactively. Accordingly, under Gaudin there was "error," and the first prong of Olano is satisfied.
B
The second prong is more difficult. Olano explained that the word "plain" is "synonymous with 'clear' or, equivalently, 'obvious.' " 507 U. S., at 734. But Olano refrained from deciding when an error must be plain to be reviewable. "At a minimum," Olano concluded, the error must be plain "under current law." Ibid. In the case with which we are faced today, the error is certainly clear under "current law," but it was by no means clear at the time of trial.
The Government contends that for an error to be "plain," it must have been so both at the time of trial and at the time of appellate consideration. In this case, it says, petitioner should have objected to the court's deciding the issue of materiality, even though near-uniform precedent both from this
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