Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 17 (1997)

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Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997)

Opinion of the Court

Having allowed AOE and Park to serve as appellants, the Court of Appeals held Arizona's Attorney General "judicial[ly] estoppe[d]" from again appearing as a party. Id., at 738-739; see also id., at 740 ("[H]aving asked the district court to dismiss him as a party, [the Attorney General] cannot now become one again.").12 With Governor Mofford choosing not to seek Court of Appeals review, the appeal became one to which neither "[the] State [n]or any agency, officer, or employee thereof [was] a party," the Ninth Circuit observed, so the State's Attorney General could appear pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b). See 939 F. 2d, at 739.13 But,

the Ninth Circuit added, § 2403(b) "confers only a limited right," a right pendent to the AOE/Park appeal, "to make an argument on the question of [Article XXVIII's] constitutionality." Id., at 739-740.

Prior to the Ninth Circuit's July 1991 opinion, indeed the very day after AOE, Park, and the Arizona Attorney General filed their notices of appeal, a development of prime importance occurred. On April 10, 1990, Yniguez resigned from state employment in order to accept another job. Her resig-decisions of the federal courts of appeals." Id., at 737. But cf. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 617 (1989) ("state courts . . . possess the authority, absent a provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render binding judicial decisions that rest on their own interpretations of federal law"); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364, 375-376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (Supremacy Clause does not require state courts to follow rulings by federal courts of appeals on questions of federal law).

12 Because the Court of Appeals found AOE and Park to be proper appellants, that court did not "address the question whether the Attorney General would have standing to appeal under Article III if no other party were willing and able to appeal." 939 F. 2d, at 738. The Court of Appeals assumed, however, that "whenever the constitutionality of a provision of state law is called into question, the state government will have a sufficient interest [to satisfy] Article III." Id., at 733, n. 4. Cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 137 (1986) (intervening State had standing to appeal from judgment holding state law unconstitutional); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62 (1986) ("a State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute").

13 The full text of 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b) is set out supra, at 55, n. 10.

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