Cite as: 521 U. S. 74 (1997)
Breyer, J., dissenting
938 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But judicial administration of a test that applied to all such voter group characteristics would involve courts yet more deeply in the basically political task of drawing and redrawing district boundaries.
In focusing on these practical considerations, I repeat what previous dissents have argued. I do so because the holding here underscores the problems mentioned in those earlier dissents; and those problems, in turn, cast further doubt upon the soundness of today's decision.
III
I do not necessarily agree or disagree with those other aspects of the majority's opinion that I have not mentioned. But I shall stop with the main point. The Court, perhaps by focusing upon what it considered to be unreasonably pervasive positive use of race as a redistricting factor, has created a legal doctrine that will unreasonably restrict legislators' use of race, even for the most benign, or antidiscriminatory, purposes. And that doctrine will draw the Court too deeply into an area of legislative responsibility. For the reasons set forth here, and in previous dissenting opinions, I do not believe that the Constitution embodies the doctrine that the majority enunciates. And I believe that Upham requires us to vacate the District Court's judgment and remand the suit.
[Appendix to opinion of Breyer, J., follows this page.]
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