508
Syllabus
erty, or property, without due process of law," or denying any person the "equal protection of the laws," § 1, and empowers Congress "to enforce" those guarantees by "appropriate legislation," § 5. Respondent Archbishop and the United States contend that RFRA is permissible enforcement legislation under § 5. Although Congress certainly can enact legislation enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, see, e. g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303, its § 5 power "to enforce" is only preventive or "remedial," South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 326. The Amendment's design and § 5's text are inconsistent with any suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Amendment's restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the Free Exercise Clause's meaning cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect. The need to distinguish between remedy and substance is supported by the Fourteenth Amendment's history and this Court's case law, see, e. g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 13-14, 15; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 209, 296. The Amendment's design has proved significant also in maintaining the traditional separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary, depriving Congress of any power to interpret and elaborate on its meaning by conferring self-executing substantive rights against the States, cf. id., at 325, and thereby leaving the interpretive power with the Judiciary. Pp. 516-529. (c) RFRA is not a proper exercise of Congress' § 5 enforcement power because it contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal-state balance. An instructive comparison may be drawn between RFRA and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, provisions of which were upheld in Katzenbach, supra, and subsequent voting rights cases. In contrast to the record of widespread and persisting racial discrimination which confronted Congress and the Judiciary in those cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of any instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry in the past 40 years. Rather, the emphasis of the RFRA hearings was on laws like the one at issue that place incidental burdens on religion. It is difficult to maintain that such laws are based on animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices or that they indicate some widespread
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