City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 3 (1997)

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Cite as: 521 U. S. 507 (1997)

Syllabus

pattern of religious discrimination in this country. RFRA's most serious shortcoming, however, lies in the fact that it is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections, proscribing state conduct that the Fourteenth Amendment itself does not prohibit. Its sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter. Its restrictions apply to every government agency and official, § 2000bb- 2(1), and to all statutory or other law, whether adopted before or after its enactment, § 2000bb-3(a). It has no termination date or termination mechanism. Any law is subject to challenge at any time by any individual who claims a substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion. Such a claim will often be difficult to contest. See Smith, supra, at 887. Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional law. 494 U. S., at 888. Furthermore, the least restrictive means requirement was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify. All told, RFRA is a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens, and is not designed to identify and counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion. Pp. 529-536. 73 F. 3d 1352, reversed.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined as to all but Part III-A-1. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 536. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 537. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined except as to the first paragraph of Part I, post, p. 544. Souter, J., post, p. 565, and Breyer, J., post, p. 566, filed dissenting opinions.

Marci A. Hamilton argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Lowell F. Denton and Gordon L. Hollon.

Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor of Ohio, argued the cause for the State of Ohio et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Betty D. Montgomery, Attor-

509

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