State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 12 (1997)

Page:   Index   Previous  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  Next

14

STATE OIL CO. v. KHAN

Opinion of the Court

at 54-57 (citing, e. g., Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 282 (1975); Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 506 (1965)). The Court concluded that, because "departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than—as in Schwinn—upon formalistic line drawing," the appropriate course would be "to return to the rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn." GTE Sylvania, supra, at 58-59.

In GTE Sylvania, the Court declined to comment on Albrecht's per se treatment of vertical maximum price restrictions, noting that the issue "involve[d] significantly different questions of analysis and policy." 433 U. S., at 51, n. 18. Subsequent decisions of the Court, however, have hinted that the analytical underpinnings of Albrecht were substantially weakened by GTE Sylvania. We noted in Maricopa County that vertical restraints are generally more defensible than horizontal restraints. See 457 U. S., at 348, n. 18. And we explained in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U. S. 335, 341-342 (1987), that decisions such as GTE Sylvania "recognize the possibility that a vertical restraint imposed by a single manufacturer or wholesaler may stimulate interbrand competition even as it reduces intrabrand competition."

Most recently, in ARCO, 495 U. S. 328 (1990), although Albrecht's continuing validity was not squarely before the Court, some disfavor with that decision was signaled by our statement that we would "assume, arguendo, that Albrecht correctly held that vertical, maximum price fixing is subject to the per se rule." 495 U. S., at 335, n. 5. More significantly, we specifically acknowledged that vertical maximum price fixing "may have procompetitive interbrand effects," and pointed out that, in the wake of GTE Sylvania, "[t]he

Page:   Index   Previous  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007