Cite as: 522 U. S. 3 (1997)
Opinion of the Court
procompetitive potential of a vertical maximum price restraint is more evident . . . than it was when Albrecht was decided, because exclusive territorial arrangements and other nonprice restrictions were unlawful per se in 1968." 495 U. S., at 343, n. 13 (citing several commentators identifying procompetitive effects of vertical maximum price fixing, including, e. g., P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law
¶ 340.30b, p. 378, n. 24 (1988 Supp.); Blair & Harrison, Re-thinking Antitrust Injury, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1539, 1553 (1989); Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 886, 887-890 (1981)) (hereinafter Easterbrook).
B
Thus, our reconsideration of Albrecht's continuing validity is informed by several of our decisions, as well as a considerable body of scholarship discussing the effects of vertical restraints. Our analysis is also guided by our general view that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competition. See, e. g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U. S. 717, 726 (1988). "Low prices," we have explained, "benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition." ARCO, supra, at 340. Our interpretation of the Sherman Act also incorporates the notion that condemnation of practices resulting in lower prices to consumers is "especially costly" because "cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 594 (1986).
So informed, we find it difficult to maintain that vertically imposed maximum prices could harm consumers or competition to the extent necessary to justify their per se invalidation. As Chief Judge Posner wrote for the Court of Appeals in this case:
"As for maximum resale price fixing, unless the supplier is a monopsonist he cannot squeeze his dealers' margins
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