464
Scalia, J., dissenting
litigation about base-year GME costs, principles of issue preclusion do not hold fast. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 353 (1877) ("[T]he judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted . . . . [T]he inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated." (emphasis added)); cf. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U. S. 504, 517 (1994) (declining to bind Secretary to GME cost determination previously made by intermediary).
* * *
In sum, we agree with the Secretary that the reaudit rule is not impermissibly retroactive, and that it "reflects a reasonable interpretation of the law." Thus, it "merits our approbation." Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U. S. 392, 409 (1996). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
The Medicare Act requires the Secretary to reimburse teaching hospitals for the Graduate Medical Education (GME) costs attributable to Medicare services. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq. For fiscal years 1965 through 1984, hospitals were entitled to be reimbursed for the actual "reasonable costs" incurred each year. See §§ 1395f(b)(1), x(v)(1)(A). In 1986, however, Congress directed that thereafter reimbursement rates per full-time-equivalent resident would be indexed to each hospital's 1984 GME costs "recognized as reasonable under this subchapter," divided by the number of full-time-equivalent residents that year. See § 1395ww(h)(2)(A).1 The Court today determines that the
1 Title 42 U. S. C. § 1395ww(h)(2)(A) provides that "[t]he Secretary shall determine, for the hospital's cost reporting period that began during fiscal year 1984, the average amount recognized as reasonable under this sub-
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