Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520, 2 (1998)

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next

Cite as: 522 U. S. 520 (1998)

Syllabus

country set forth in § 1151), and that satisfy two requirements—first, they must have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under federal superintendence. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 46, United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442, 449, and United States v. McGowan, 302 U. S. 535, 538-539. Those cases held that these two requirements were necessary for a finding of "Indian country" generally before § 1151 was enacted, and Congress codified these requirements in enacting § 1151. Section 1151 does not purport to alter the cases' definition of Indian country. Section 1151(b)'s text, moreover, was taken virtually verbatim from Sandoval, supra, at 46, which language was later quoted in McGowan, supra, at 538. The legislative history states that § 1151(b)'s definition is based on those cases, and the requirements are reflected in § 1151(b)'s text: The federal set-aside requirement ensures that the land in question is occupied by an "Indian community"; the federal superintendence requirement guarantees that that community is sufficiently "dependent" on the Federal Government that the Government and the Indians involved, rather than the States, are to exercise primary jurisdiction over the land. Pp. 526-531.

(b) The Tribe's ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements. The federal set-aside requirement is not met because ANCSA, far from designating Alaskan lands for Indian use, revoked all existing Alaska reservations "set aside by legislation or by Executive or Secretarial Order for Native use," save one. 43 U. S. C. § 1618(a) (emphasis added). Congress could not more clearly have departed from its traditional practice of setting aside Indian lands. Cf. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U. S. 399, 401. The difficulty with the Tribe's argument that the ANCSA lands were set apart for the use of the Neets'aii Gwich'in, "as such," by their acquisition pursuant to § 1618(b) is that ANCSA transferred reservation lands to private, state-chartered Native corporations, without any restraints on alienation or significant use restrictions, and with the goal of avoiding "any permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations," § 1601(b); see also §§ 1607, 1613. Thus, Congress contemplated that non-Natives could own the former Venetie Reservation, and the Tribe is free to use it for non-Indian purposes.

Equally clearly, ANCSA ended federal superintendence over the Tribe's lands by revoking all existing Alaska reservations but one, see § 1618(a), and by stating that ANCSA's settlement provisions were intended to avoid a "lengthy wardship or trusteeship," § 1601(b). Although ANCSA exempts the Tribe's land, as long as it has not been sold, leased, or developed, from adverse possession claims, real property taxes, and certain judgments, see § 1636(d), these protections simply

521

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007