526
Opinion of the Court
cies toward that area; (4) the degree of federal ownership of and control over the area; (5) the degree of cohesiveness of the area inhabitants; and (6) the extent to which the area was set aside for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples." Id., at 1294.
Applying this test, the Court of Appeals concluded that the "federal set aside" and "federal superintendence" requirements were met and that the Tribe's land was therefore Indian country. Id., at 1300-1302.
Judge Fernandez wrote separately. In his view, ANCSA was intended to be a departure from traditional Indian policy: "It attempted to preserve Indian tribes, but simultaneously attempted to sever them from the land; it attempted to leave them as sovereign entities for some purposes, but as sovereigns without territorial reach." Id., at 1303. Noting that the majority's holding called into question the status of all 44 million acres of land conveyed by ANCSA, he wrote that "[w]ere we writing on a clean slate, I would eschew the tribe's request and would avoid creating the kind of chaos that the 92nd Congress wisely sought to avoid." Id., at 1304. He nonetheless concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent required him to concur in the result. Ibid. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the Tribe's land is Indian country. 521 U. S. 1103 (1997).
II
A
"Indian country" is currently defined at 18 U. S. C. § 1151. In relevant part, the statute provides:
"[T]he term 'Indian country' . . . means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government . . . , (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of
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