124
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
would be entirely unnecessary. Thus, ironically, the Court is engaged in a version of the "hypothetical jurisdiction" that it has taken pains to condemn at some length.
II
There is an important reason for addressing the statutory question first: to avoid unnecessarily passing on an undecided constitutional question. New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568, 582-583 (1979); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).17
Whether correct or incorrect, the Court's constitutional holding represents a significant extension of prior case law.
The Court's conclusion that respondent does not have standing comes from a mechanistic application of the "redressability" aspect of our standing doctrine. "Redressability," of course, does not appear anywhere in the text of the Constitution. Instead, it is a judicial creation of the past 25 years, see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41-46 (1976); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617-618 (1973)—a judicial interpretation of the "Case" requirement of Article III, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 559-561 (1992).18
cover the cost of the investigation that preceded the filing of respondent's complaint, even under the Court's reasoning respondent would have alleged a "redressable" injury and would have standing. See ibid.
17 There are two other reasons that counsel in favor of answering the statutory question first. First, it is the statutory question that has divided the courts of appeals and that we granted certiorari to resolve. See Pet. for Cert. i. Second, the meaning of the statute is a matter of general and national importance, whereas the Court's answer to the constitutional question depends largely on a construction of the allegations of this particular complaint, ante, at 104 ("We turn now to the particulars of respond-ent's complaint to see how it measures up to Article III's requirements").
18 In an attempt to demonstrate that redressability has always been a component of the standing doctrine, the Court cites our decision in Marye v. Parsons, 114 U. S. 325 (1885), a case in which neither the word "standing" nor the word "redressability" appears.
Page: Index Previous 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007