126
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
and not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court" (emphasis added)); Warth, 422 U. S., at 504-508 (stating that "the indirectness of the injury . . . may make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. III," and holding that the injury at issue was too indirect to be redressable), as well as in every other case in which the Court denied standing because of a lack of redressability, Leeke, 454 U. S., at 86-87 (injury indirect because it turned on the action of a prosecutor, a party not before the Court); Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 617-618 (stating that "[t]he party who invokes [judicial] power must be able to show . . . that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury" (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); injury indirect because it turned on the action of the father, a party not before the Court); see also 3 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 30 (3d ed. 1994).21 Thus, as far as I am aware, the Court has never held—until today—that a plaintiff who is directly injured 22 by a defendant lacks standing to sue because of a lack of redressability.23
21 "It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action . . . ." Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U. S. 633, 634 (1937).
22 Assuming that EPCRA authorizes suits for wholly past violations, then Congress has created a legal right in having EPCRA reports filed on time. Although this is not a traditional injury: "[W]e must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition. . . . Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before . . . ." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363, 373-374 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975).
23 In another context, the Court has specified that there is a critical distinction between whether a defendant is directly or indirectly harmed. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, a case involving a challenge to Executive action, the Court stated:
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