Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 2 (1998)

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358

PENNSYLVANIA BD. OF PROBATION AND PAROLE v. SCOTT

Syllabus

probative evidence. Leon, 468 U. S., at 907. Recognizing these costs, the Court has repeatedly declined to extend the rule to proceedings other than criminal trials. E. g., id., at 909. It again declines to do so here. The social costs of allowing convicted criminals who violate their parole to remain at large are particularly high, see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 477, 483, and are compounded by the fact that parolees (particularly those who have already committed parole violations) are more likely to commit future crimes than are average citizens, see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 880. Application of the exclusionary rule, moreover, would be incompatible with the traditionally flexible, nonadversarial, administrative procedures of parole revocation, see Morrissey, supra, at 480, 489, in that it would require extensive litigation to determine whether particular evidence must be excluded, cf., e. g., Calandra, supra, at 349. The rule would provide only minimal deterrence benefits in this context, because its application in criminal trials already provides significant deterrence of unconstitutional searches. Cf. United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 448, 454. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's special rule for situations in which the searching officer knows his subject is a parolee is rejected because this Court has never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence, e. g., Calandra, supra, at 350; because such a piecemeal approach would add an additional layer of collateral litigation regarding the officer's knowledge of the parolee's status; and because, in any event, any additional deterrence would be minimal, whether the person conducting the search was a police officer or a parole officer. Pp. 362-369.

548 Pa. 418, 698 A. 2d 32, reversed and remanded.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and OTMConnor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 369. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 370.

D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John G. Knorr III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Gregory R. Neuhauser and Calvin R. Koons, Senior Deputy Attorneys General.

Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant At-

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