Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 26 (1999)

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Cite as: 525 U. S. 182 (1999)

Thomas, J., concurring in judgment

supra, at 434; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 788- 790 (1983).

Predictability of decisions in this area is certainly important, but unfortunately there is no bright line separating severe from lesser burdens. When a State's election law directly regulates core political speech, we have always subjected the challenged restriction to strict scrutiny and required that the legislation be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. See, e. g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, 198 (1992) (Tennessee law prohibiting solicitation of voters and distribution of campaign literature within 100 feet of the entrance of a polling place); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U. S. 45, 53-54 (1982) (Kentucky's regulation of candidate campaign promises); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978) (Massachusetts law prohibiting certain business entities from making expenditures for the purpose of affecting referendum votes).

Even where a State's law does not directly regulate core political speech, we have applied strict scrutiny. For example, in Meyer v. Grant, 486 U. S. 414 (1988), we considered a challenge to Colorado's law making it a felony to pay initiative petition circulators. We applied strict scrutiny because we determined that initiative petition circulation "of necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change." Id., at 421. In Citizens Against Rent Control/ Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290 (1981), we subjected to strict scrutiny a city ordinance limiting contributions to committees formed to oppose ballot initiatives because it impermissibly burdened association and expression. Id., at 294.

When core political speech is at issue, we have ordinarily applied strict scrutiny without first determining that the State's law severely burdens speech. Indeed, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995), the Court suggested that we only resort to our severe/lesser burden

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