Cite as: 525 U. S. 471 (1999)
Souter, J., dissenting
to become effective immediately while providing that pending administrative proceedings should be completed under the scheme of judicial review in effect when they were commenced.
I should add that I agree with Justice SouterTMs explanation of why § 1252(g) applies broadly to removal proceedings rather than to only three discrete parts of such proceedings. See post, at 505-507 (dissenting opinion). I do not, however, share his constitutional doubt concerning the prohibition of collateral proceedings such as this one. Of course, Congress could not authorize punishment of innocent persons because they happen to be members of an organization that engaged in terrorism. For the reasons stated in Part III of the Court's opinion, however, I have no doubt that the Attorney General may give priority to the removal of deportable aliens who are members of such an organization. See ante, at 487-492. Accordingly, I agree that the judgment of the District Court must be vacated.
Justice Souter, dissenting.
The unhappy history of the provisions at issue in this case reveals that Congress, apparently unintentionally, enacted legislation that simultaneously grants and denies the right of judicial review to certain aliens who were in deportation proceedings before April 1, 1997. Finding no trump in the two mutually exclusive statutory provisions, I would invoke the principle of constitutional doubt and apply the provision that avoids a potential constitutional difficulty. Because the Court today instead purports to resolve the contradiction with a reading that strains the meaning of the text beyond what I think it can bear, I respectfully dissent.
I
The first of the contradictory provisions is put in play by § 306(c)(1) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-612, as
501
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