Cite as: 525 U. S. 471 (1999)
Souter, J., dissenting
pre-existing judicial review for the self-same class of aliens to whom § 306(c)(1) bars review.
We do not have to dwell on how this contradiction arose.1 What matters for our purposes is that §§ 306(c)(1)
1 Section 306(c)(1) was originally enacted on September 30, 1996. As it then read, it first provided that new 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (1994 ed., Supp. III) would apply "to all final orders of deportation or removal and motions to reopen filed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act," 110 Stat. 3009-612, and then provided that subsection (g) would apply without limitation. Under this transitional arrangement, no review was available to an alien in proceedings after September 30, 1996, until such time as a final order was issued against the alien. When a final order issued, the alien would be entitled to any judicial review available under new § 1252. The intent of this provision was thus presumably to preclude judicial review of nonfinal steps in the removal procedure in the interim before IIRIRA's effective date of April 1, 1997. This arrangement, however, conflicted with the different transitional provision set out in § 309(c)(4). This section, entitled "Transitional Changes in Judicial Review," provides that where a final order was "entered more than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act," subsection (b) of the old 8 U. S. C. § 1105a does not apply. This subsection provides for habeas corpus proceedings for "any alien against whom a final order of exclusion has been made." In other words, § 309(c)(4) expressly contemplates that old § 1105a, less its habeas provision, applies to cases where a final order is issued more than 30 days after September 30, 1996, whereas the original § 306(c)(1) as enacted contemplated that when a final order was issued on or after September 30, 1996, the new § 1252 would apply.
It appears that Congress noticed this discrepancy. On October 4, 1996, Representative Lamar Smith of Texas explained on the floor of the House that he had "become aware of an apparent technical error in two provisions" of IIRIRA. 142 Cong. Rec. H12293. He explained that "[i]t was the clear intent of the conferees that, as a general matter, the full package of changes made by [new 8 U. S. C. § 1252] effect [sic] those cases filed in court after the enactment of the new law, leaving cases already pending before the courts to continue under existing law." Ibid. By "before the courts," Representative Smith seems to have meant the immigration courts. He went on to explain § 309(c)(4): "The conferees also intended, however, to accelerate the implementation of certain of the reforms [in new § 1252]. This intent is clearly spelled out in section 309 of the act. Specifically, section 309(c)(4) calls for accelerated implementation of some of the reforms made in section 306 regarding judicial review, but does not
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