Cite as: 526 U. S. 227 (1999)
Opinion of the Court
termination that at least one aggravating factor had been proved. Hildwin, therefore, can hardly be read as resolving the issue discussed here, as the reasoning in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), confirms.
Walton dealt with an argument only slightly less expansive than the one in Spaziano, that every finding underlying a sentencing determination must be made by a jury. Although the Court's rejection of that position cited Hildwin, it characterized the nature of capital sentencing by quoting from Poland v. Arizona, 476 U. S. 147, 156 (1986). See 497 U. S., at 648. There, the Court described statutory specifications of aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing as "standards to guide the . . . choice between the alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment." Ibid. (quoting Poland, supra, at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court thus characterized the finding of aggravating facts falling within the traditional scope of capital sentencing as a choice between a greater and a lesser penalty, not as a process of raising the ceiling of the sentencing range available. We are frank to say that we emphasize this careful reading of Walton's rationale because the question implicated by the Government's position on the meaning of § 2119(2) is too significant to be decided without being squarely faced.
In sum, the Government's view would raise serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive. Any doubt on the issue of statutory construction is hence to be resolved in favor of avoiding those questions.11 This is
11 In tones of alarm, the dissent suggests, see post, at 254, 271, that our decision will unsettle the efforts of many States to bring greater consistency to their sentencing practices through provisions for determinate sentences and statutorily or administratively established guidelines governing sentencing decisions. The dissent's concern is misplaced for several reasons. Most immediately, our decision today does not announce any new principle of constitutional law, but merely interprets a particular federal statute in light of a set of constitutional concerns that have emerged through a series of our decisions over the past quarter century. But even
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