254
Kennedy, J., dissenting
Justice Kennedy, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice OTMConnor, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
The question presented is whether the federal carjacking statute, prohibiting the taking of a motor vehicle from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, contains in the first paragraph a complete definition of the offense, with all of the elements of the crime Congress intended to codify. 18 U. S. C. § 2119. In my view, shared by every Court of Appeals to have addressed the issue, it does. The Court adopts a contrary, strained reading according to which the single statutory section prohibits three distinct offenses.
Had it involved simply a question of statutory interpretation, the majority opinion would not have been cause for much concern. Questions of statutory interpretation can be close but nonetheless routine. That should have been so in today's case. The Court, however, is unwilling to rest its opinion on textual analysis. Rather, to bolster its statutory interpretation, the Court raises the specter of " 'grave and doubtful constitutional questions,' " ante, at 239, without an adequate explanation of the origins, contours, or consequences of its constitutional concerns. The Court's reliance on the so-called constitutional doubt rule is inconsistent with usual principles of stare decisis and contradicts the approach followed just last Term in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224 (1998). Our precedents admit of no real doubt regarding the power of Congress to establish serious bodily injury and death as sentencing factors rather than offense elements, as we made clear in Almendarez-Torres. Departing from this recent authority, the Court's sweeping constitutional discussion casts doubt on sentencing practices and assumptions followed not only in the federal system but also in many States. Thus, among other unsettling consequences, today's decision intrudes upon legitimate and vital state interests, upsetting the proper federal balance. I dissent from this unfortunate and unnecessary result.
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