Cite as: 526 U. S. 358 (1999)
Syllabus
the terms of the insurance relationship in ERISA plans; insurers could displace any state regulation simply by inserting a contrary term in plan documents. This interpretation would virtually read the saving clause out of ERISA. Second, whatever the merits of UNUM's view that § 1132(a) preempts any action for plan benefits brought under state rules such as notice-prejudice, the issue is not implicated here. Because Ward sued under § 1132(a)(1)(B) "to recover benefits due . . . under the terms of his plan," invoking the notice-prejudice rule as the relevant rule of decision for his § 1132(a) suit, the case does not raise the question whether § 1132(a) provides the sole launching ground for an ERISA enforcement action. Finally, the Court rejects UNUM's suggestion that the notice-prejudice rule conflicts with § 1133, which requires plans to provide notice and the opportunity for review of denied claims, or with Department of Labor regulations providing that a claim is filed when the requirements of a reasonable claim filing procedure have been met. By allowing a longer period to file than the minimum filing terms mandated by federal law, the notice-prejudice rule complements rather than contradicts ERISA and the regulations. Pp. 375-377.
3. California's Elfstrom agency rule "relate[s] to" ERISA plans, and therefore does not occupy ground outside ERISA's preemption clause. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's view that Elfstrom is consistent with this Court's ERISA preemption precedent because it does not dictate the manner in which the plan will be administered, deeming the policyholder-employer the agent of the insurer would have a marked effect on plan administration: It would force the employer, as plan administrator, to assume a role, with attendant legal duties and consequences, that it has not undertaken voluntarily; and it would affect not merely the plan's bookkeeping obligations regarding to whom benefits checks must be sent, but would also regulate the basic services that a plan may or must provide to its participants and beneficiaries. Pp. 377-379.
135 F. 3d 1276, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
William J. Kayatta, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David L. Bacon, Charles M. Dyke, Barbara H. Furey, Brian G. Kanner, Tamarra T. Rennick, Lesley C. Green, and Russell G. Petti.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With
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