Opinion of the Court
therein." Assuming an importer complies with the documentary requirements of § 10.24, the disclaimer in § 10.11(a) is applicable, and the importer is entitled to bring a refund suit challenging Customs' decision in federal court.
Apart from underscoring this distinction between substantive rules and documentary requirements, the quoted language from § 10.11(a) may be thought surplusage in that it merely confirms the existence of judicial review. Even if the language is thought to be unnecessary, however, we do not view it as a tacit instruction for courts to disregard the substantive regulations. Particularly in light of the fact that the agency utilized the notice-and-comment rulemaking process before issuing the regulations, the argument that they were not intended to be entitled to judicial deference implies a sufficient departure from conventional contemporary administrative practice that we ought not to adopt it absent a different statutory structure and more express language to this effect in the regulations themselves.
For the reasons we have given, the statutes authorizing customs classification regulations are consistent with the usual rule that regulations of an administering agency warrant judicial deference; and nothing in the regulation itself persuades us that the agency intended the regulation to have some lesser force and effect. We turn to respondent's second major contention, that the statutes governing the reviewing authority of the Court of International Trade in classification cases displace this customary framework.
In support of the argument that Chevron rules are inapplicable, both respondent and the Court of Appeals rely on 28 U. S. C. § 2643. It provides:
"If the Court of International Trade is unable to determine the correct decision on the basis of the evidence presented in any civil action, the court may order a re-trial or rehearing for all purposes, or may order suchPage: Index Previous 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Next
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