United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 18 (1999)

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Cite as: 526 U. S. 380 (1999)

Opinion of Stevens, J.

decisions that must be made by agencies to which Congress has delegated the job of administering legislation that contains ambiguous terms. When lines must be drawn to determine whether a particular facility is a "stationary source" of air pollution, see Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), or whether an operation performed abroad was "incidental to the assembly process," there will always be cases on opposite sides of the line that are almost identical. That consequence, however, does not necessarily compromise the integrity of the line that the agency has drawn or the manner in which the rule was applied.

In my view, the regulation before us is a reasonable elaboration of the statute, and the Customs Service's denial of a duty allowance in this case was consistent with its regulation and well within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority. If we had not granted certiorari to decide the reasonableness of the regulation, I would agree with the Court's disposition of the case. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U. S. 137, 159 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But since we did direct the parties to enlighten us on these issues, and since I think the answer is clear, I would simply reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I do, however, join Parts I, II, and III of the Court's well-reasoned opinion.

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