42
Syllabus
vate prerogative to withhold payment, then restricted it, and now (in one limited respect) has restored it, cannot constitute the delegation of an exclusive public function. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 162, n. 12. Finally, respondents misplace their reliance on a "joint participation" theory of state action. Privately owned enterprises providing services that the State would not necessarily provide, even though they are extensively regulated, do not fall within the ambit of that theory. E. g., Blum, supra, at 1011; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, and Lugar, supra, distinguished. Pp. 49-58.
2. The Pennsylvania regime does not deprive disabled employees of "property" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Only after finding deprivation of a protected property interest does this Court look to see if the State's procedures com-port with due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 332. Here, respondents contend that state law confers upon them such a protected interest in workers' compensation medical benefits. However, under Pennsylvania law, an employee is not entitled to payment for all medical treatment once the employer's initial liability is established, as respondents' argument assumes. Instead, the law expressly limits an employ-ee's entitlement to "reasonable" and "necessary" medical treatment, and requires that disputes over the reasonableness and necessity of particular treatment be resolved before an employer's obligation to pay—and an employee's entitlement to benefits—arise. Thus, for an employee's property interest in the payment of medical benefits to attach under state law, the employee must clear two hurdles: He must prove (1) that an employer is liable for a work-related injury, and (2) that the particular medical treatment at issue is reasonable and necessary. While respondents have cleared the first hurdle, they have yet to satisfy the second. Consequently, they do not have the property interest they claim. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 261-263, and Mathews, supra, at 332, distinguished. Pp. 58-61.
139 F. 3d 158, reversed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I and II of which were joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., and Part III of which was joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 61. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 62. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 63.
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007