568
Stevens, J., dissenting
lieve that narcotics were present, was invalid. 710 So. 2d 949 (1998).1
In 1971, after advising us that "we must not lose sight of the Fourth Amendment's fundamental guarantee," Justice Stewart made this comment on what was then settled law:
"[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' The exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be 'a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.' '[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.' " Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 453, 454-455 (foot-notes omitted).
Because the Fourth Amendment plainly "protects property as well as privacy" and seizures as well as searches, Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 62-64 (1992), I would apply to the present case our longstanding warrant presumption.2
1 The Florida Supreme Court's opinion could be read to suggest that due process protections in the Florida Constitution might independently require a warrant or other judicial process before seizure under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. See 710 So. 2d, at 952 (discussing Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (1991)). However, the certified question put to that court referred only to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 710 So. 2d, at 950. Thus, a viable federal question was presented for us to decide on certiorari, but of course we have no authority to determine the limits of state constitutional or statutory safeguards.
2 E. g., United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U. S. 297, 315-318 (1972) ("Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of 'unreasonable searches and seizures,' the definition of 'reasonableness' turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of the warrant clause"); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 454-455 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); Johnson v. United
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