Cite as: 526 U. S. 559 (1999)
Stevens, J., dissenting
will be involved before private property is seized can only help ensure that law enforcement officers will initiate forfeiture proceedings only when they are truly justified. A warrant requirement might not prevent delay and the attendant opportunity for official mischief through discretionary timing, but it surely makes delay more tolerable.
Without a legitimate exception, the presumption should prevail. Indeed, the particularly troubling aspect of this case is not that the State provides a weak excuse for failing to obtain a warrant either before or after White's arrest, but that it offers us no reason at all. The justification cannot be that the authorities feared their narcotics investigation would be exposed and hindered if a warrant had been obtained. Ex parte warrant applications provide neutral review of police determinations of probable cause, but such procedures are by no means public. And the officers had months to take advantage of them. On this record, one must assume that the officers who seized White's car simply preferred to avoid the hassle of seeking approval from a judicial officer. I would not permit bare convenience to overcome our established preference for the warrant process as a check against arbitrary intrusions by law enforcement agencies "engaged in the often competitive"—and, here, potentially lucrative—"enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
Because I agree with the Florida Supreme Court's judgment that this seizure was not reasonable without a warrant, I respectfully dissent.
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