Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 10 (1999)

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822

RICHARDSON v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

tradition or a rule. People v. Gear, supra, at 89-92, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 263-265.

In fact, federal criminal law's treatment of recidivism offers a competing analogy no more distant than the analogy the Government offers. See Garrett v. United States, supra, at 782 (the statute originated in a "recidivist provision . . . that provided for enhanced sentences"). If one looks to recidivism, one finds that commission of a prior crime will lead to an enhanced punishment only when a relevant factfinder, judge, or jury has found that the defendant committed that specific individual prior crime. Where sentencing is at issue, the judge, enhancing a sentence in light of recidivism, must find a prior individual conviction, United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§ 4A1.1, 4B1.1 (Nov. 1998), which means that an earlier factfinder (e. g., a unanimous federal jury in the case of a federal crime) found that the defendant committed the specific earlier crime, §§ 4A1.2(a)(1), 4B1.2(c). Where a substantive statute is at issue, for example, a statute forbidding a felon's possession of a firearm, 18 U. S. C. § 922(g) (1994 ed. and Supp. III), the relevant precondition, namely that the gun possessor be a felon, means at a minimum that an earlier factfinder (e. g., a unanimous federal jury in the case of a federal crime) found that the defendant in fact committed that earlier individual crime. The Government's interpretation is inconsistent with this practice, for it, in effect, imposes punishment on a defendant for the underlying crimes without any factfinder having found that the defendant committed those crimes. If there are federal statutes reflecting a different practice or tradition, the Government has not called them to our attention, which suggests that any such statute would represent a lesser known exception to ordinary practice. Cf. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U. S., at 633 (plurality opinion) ("[I]t is an assumption of our system of criminal justice . . . that no person may be punished criminally save upon proof of some specific illegal conduct").

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