Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 11 (1999)

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Cite as: 526 U. S. 813 (1999)

Opinion of the Court

Neither are we convinced by the Government's two remaining significant arguments. First, the Government says that a jury-unanimity requirement will make the statute's crime too difficult to prove—to the point where it is unreasonable to assume Congress intended such a requirement. But we do not understand why a unanimity requirement would produce that level of difficulty. After all, the Government routinely obtains the testimony of underlings— street-level dealers who could point to specific incidents—as well as the testimony of agents who make controlled buys or otherwise observe drug transactions. Such witnesses should not have inordinate difficulty pointing to specific transactions. Or, if they do have difficulty, would that difficulty in proving individual specific transactions not tend to cast doubt upon the existence of the requisite "series"?

The dissent, but not the Government, argues that the prosecution will now have to prove that the defendant derived substantial income or resources from, and that five persons were involved with, the specific underlying crimes the jury unanimously agrees were committed. See post, at 830. To the extent the dissent suggests that those other statutory requirements must be satisfied with respect to each underlying crime, it is clearly wrong. Those requirements must be met with respect to the series, which, at a minimum, permits the jury to look at all of the agreed-upon violations in combination. Even if the jury were limited to the agreed-upon violations, we still fail to see why prosecutions would prove unduly difficult. The dissent writes as if it follows from its reading that conviction under the CCE statute depends on specific proof of specific sales to specific street-level users. See post, at 832. That is not true. A specific transaction is not an element of possession with intent to distribute under 21 U. S. C. § 841. It would be enough to present testimony, like that of Michael Sargent partially recounted by the dissent, showing that the defendant supplied a runner in his organization with large quantities of drugs on or about

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