Federal Employees v. Department of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 20 (1999)

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94

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES v. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR

Opinion of the Court

gaining itself, are not otherwise identical in the two sectors. For all these reasons, we find in the relevant statutory language ambiguity, not certainty.

Second, the Agency—like the Fourth Circuit—contends that the Statute's policies demand a reading of the statutory language that would exclude midterm bargaining from its definition of "collective bargaining." The availability of midterm bargaining, the Agency argues, might lead unions to withhold certain subjects from ordinary endterm negotiations and then to raise them during the term, under more favorable bargaining conditions. A union might conclude, for example, that it is more likely to get what it wants by presenting a proposal during the term (when no other issues are on the table and a compromise is less likely) and then negotiating to impasse, thus leaving the matter for the Federal Service Impasses Panel to resolve. The Agency also points out that public-sector and private-sector bargaining differ in this respect. Private-sector unions enforce their views through strikes, and because they hesitate to strike midterm, they also have no particular incentive to bargain midterm. But public-sector unions enforce their views through compulsory arbitration, not strikes. Hence, the argument goes, public-sector unions have a unique incentive to bargain midterm on a piecemeal basis, thereby threatening to undermine the basic collective-bargaining process. See, e. g., SSA, 956 F. 2d, at 1288-1289.

Other policy concerns, however, argue for a different reading of the Statute. Without midterm bargaining, for example, will it prove possible to find a collective solution to a workplace problem, say, a health or safety hazard, that first appeared midterm? The Statute's emphasis upon collective bargaining as "contribut[ing] to the effective conduct of public business," 5 U. S. C. § 7101(a)(1)(B), suggests that it would favor joint, not unilateral, solutions to such midterm problems.

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