Federal Employees v. Department of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 24 (1999)

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98

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES v. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR

Opinion of the Court

agement (e. g., promotions) shall not preclude negotiations about certain related matters (e. g., promotion procedures). By its terms, then, subsection (b) does nothing more than create an exception to subsection (a), preserving the duty to bargain with respect to certain matters otherwise committed to the discretion of management. Because § 7106(b) chiefly addresses the subject matter of bargaining and not the timing, one could reasonably conclude that while that subsection contemplates midterm bargaining in the circumstances there specified, the duty to bargain midterm finds its source elsewhere in the Statute. Hence, the management rights provision seems to hurt, as much as to help, the Agency's basic argument.

The upshot of this analysis is that where the Agency and the Fourth Circuit find a clear statutory denial of any mid-term bargaining obligation, we find ambiguity created by the Statute's use of general language that might, or might not, encompass various forms of midterm bargaining. That kind of statutory ambiguity is inconsistent both with the Fourth Circuit's absolute reading of the Statute and also with the D. C. Circuit's similarly absolute, but opposite, reading. Compare SSA, 956 F. 2d, at 1284, with NTEU, 810 F. 2d, at 301 (rejecting the Authority's position that there is no duty to bargain midterm on the ground that it is "contrary to the intent of the legislature and the guiding purpose of the statute"). Indeed, the D. C. Circuit's analysis implicitly concedes the need to make at least some midterm bargaining distinctions, when it assumes that the midterm bargaining obligation does not extend to matters that are covered by the basic contract. See id., at 296.

The statutory ambiguity is perfectly consistent, however, with the conclusion that Congress delegated to the Authority the power to determine—within appropriate legal bounds, see, e. g., 5 U. S. C. § 706 (Administrative Procedure Act); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

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