Cite as: 527 U. S. 263 (1999)
Opinion of the Court
In addition, the prosecution contended in its closing argument that the rock—not the knife—was the murder weapon.46 The prosecution did advance the theory that petitioner had a knife when he got in the car with Whitlock, but it did not specifically argue that petitioner used the knife during the robbery.47
Petitioner also maintains that he suffered prejudice from the failure to disclose the Stoltzfus documents because her testimony impacted on the jury's decision to impose the death penalty. Her testimony, however, did not relate to his eligibility for the death sentence and was not relied upon by the prosecution at all during its closing argument at the penalty phase.48 With respect to the jury's discretionary decision to impose the death penalty, it is true that Stoltzfus described petitioner as a violent, aggressive person, but that portrayal surely was not as damaging as either the evidence that he spent the evening of the murder dancing and drinking at Dice's or the powerful message conveyed by the 69-46 In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that there was "really no doubt about where it happened and what the murder weapon was. It was not a gun, it wasn't a knife. It was this thing here, it is to[o] big to be called a rock and to[o] small to be called a boulder." Id., at 167.
47 The instructions given to the jury defined a deadly weapon as "any object or instrument that is likely to cause death or great bodily injury because of the manner and under the circumstance in which it is used." Id., at 160.
48 The jury recommended death after finding the predicates of "future dangerousness" and "vileness." Neither of these predicates depended on Stoltzfus' testimony. The trial court instructed the jury, "Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the following two alternatives. One, that after consideration of his history and background, there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing, continuing serious threat to society or two, that his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman and that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of murder." Tr. 899-900.
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