Cite as: 527 U. S. 263 (1999)
Opinion of Souter, J.
must remain whether the evidentiary suppression "under-mines our confidence" that the factfinder would have reached the same result.
II
Even keeping in mind these caveats about the appropriate level of materiality, applying the standard to the facts of this case does not give the Court easy answers, as the Court candidly acknowledges. See ante, at 289. Indeed, the Court concedes that discrediting Stoltzfus's testimony "might have changed the outcome of the trial," ibid., and that the District Court was "surely correct" to find a "reasonable possibility that either a total, or just a substantial, discount of Stoltzfus' testimony might have produced a different result, either at the guilt or sentencing phases," ante, at 291.
In the end, however, the Court finds the undisclosed evidence inadequate to undermine confidence in the jury's sen-hamson, 507 U. S. 619, 637-638 (1993). We have used "reasonable probability" to define the plaintiff's burden in making out a claim under § 7 of the Clayton Act, see, e. g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 325 (1962); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 55-61 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting in part) (contrasting "reasonable possibility" and "reasonable probability" and arguing for latter as appropriate standard under Robinson-Patman Act); the standard for granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding in light of intervening developments, see, e. g., Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U. S. 163, 167 (1996) (per curiam); and the standard for exempting organizations from otherwise valid disclosure requirements in light of threats or harassment resulting from the disclosure, see, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam). We have recently used "significant possibility" in explaining the circumstances under which nominal compensation is an appropriate award in a suit under the Long-shore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, see Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U. S. 121, 123 (1997), but we most commonly use that term in defining one of the requirements for the granting of a stay pending certiorari. The three-part test requires a "reasonable probability" that the Court will grant certiorari or note probable jurisdiction, a "significant possibility" that the Court will reverse the decision below, and a likelihood of irreparable injury absent a stay. See, e. g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 895 (1983); Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U. S. 1319 (1994) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers).
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