Cite as: 527 U. S. 373 (1999)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
problems with the Fifth Circuit's application of the theory in this case. The phrase "personal characteristics" as used in factor 3(C) does not obviously include the specific personal characteristics listed in 3(B)—"young age, her slight stature, her background, and her unfamiliarity with San Angelo"— especially in light of the fact that 3(C) went on to refer to the impact of the crime on the victim's family. In the context of considering the effect of the crime on the victim's family, it would be more natural to understand "personal characteristics" to refer to those aspects of the victim's character and personality that her family would miss the most. More important, to the extent that there was any ambiguity arising from how the factors were drafted, the Government's argument to the jury made clear that 3(B) and 3(C) went to entirely different areas of aggravation—the former clearly went to victim vulnerability while the latter captured the victim's individual uniqueness and the effect of the crime on her family. See, e. g., 25 Record 2733-2734 ("[Y]ou can consider [the victim's] young age, her slight stature, her background, her unfamiliarity with the San Angelo area. . . . She is barely five feet tall [and] weighs approximately 100 pounds. [She is] the ideal victim"); id., at 2734 ("[Y]ou can consider [the victim's] personal characteristics and the effects of the instant offense on her family. . . . You heard about this young woman, you heard about her from her mother, you heard about her from her friends that knew her. She was special, she was unique, she was loving, she was caring, she had a lot to offer this world"). As such, even if the phrase "personal characteristics" as used in factor 3(C) was understood to include the specific personal characteristics listed in 3(B), the factors as a whole were not duplicative— at best, certain evidence was relevant to two different aggravating factors. Moreover, any risk that the weighing process would be skewed was eliminated by the District Court's instruction that the jury "should not simply count the number of aggravating and mitigating factors and reach a deci-
399
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