Cite as: 527 U. S. 373 (1999)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
were somewhat vague, the Fifth Circuit was wrong to conclude that the factors were not given further definition, see 132 F. 3d, at 251; as we have explained, the Government's argument made absolutely clear what each nonstatutory factor meant.15
3
Finally, we turn to petitioner's contention that the challenged nonstatutory factors were overbroad. An aggravating factor can be overbroad if the sentencing jury "fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty." Arave v. Creech, 507 U. S. 463, 474 (1993). We have not, however, specifically considered what it means for a factor to be over-broad when it is important only for selection purposes and especially when it sets forth victim vulnerability or victim impact evidence. Of course, every murder will have an impact on the victim's family and friends and victims are often chosen because of their vulnerability. It might seem, then, that the factors 3(B) and 3(C) apply to every eligible defendant and thus fall within the Eighth Amendment's proscription against overbroad factors. But that cannot be correct; if it were, we would not have decided Payne as we did. Even though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case, evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized. And such evidence is surely relevant to the selection phase decision, given that the sentencer
Penalty Act's explicit command in § 3593(f), the District Court instructed the jury not to consider race at all in reaching its decision. App. 47. Jurors are presumed to have followed their instructions. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 206 (1987).
15 We reiterate the point we made in Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U. S. 967 (1994)—we have held only a few, quite similar factors vague, see, e. g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356 (1988) (whether murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"), while upholding numerous other factors against vagueness challenges, see 512 U. S., at 974 (collecting cases).
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