438
Opinion of the Court
In Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U. S. 624 (1953), the Court held that a "license fee" similar in relevant respects to Jefferson County's was an "in-come tax" for purposes of a federal statute that defines "in-come tax" as "any tax levied on, with respect to, or measured by, net income, gross income, or gross receipts," 4 U. S. C. § 110(c). See 344 U. S., at 625, n. 2, 629.9 The Court so concluded even though the local tax was styled as "a tax upon the privilege of working within [the municipality]," was not an "income tax" under state law, and deviated from textbook income tax characteristics. Id., at 628-629; see also id., at 629 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Many kinds of income are excluded, e. g., dividends, interest, capital gains. The exclusions emphasize that the tax is on the privilege of working or doing business in [the municipality].").10
9 Howard construed the Buck Act, which authorizes state and local governments to collect "income tax[es]" from individuals who work in a "Federal area" "to the same extent . . . as though such area was not a Federal area." 4 U. S. C. § 106(a). The Buck Act defines "Federal area" to mean "any lands or premises held or acquired by or for the use of the United States." § 110(e). The United States submits that "[t]his definition appears, by its terms, to encompass premises used by the United States for the purposes of operating a federal courthouse," but further notes that the "origin and purpose of the Buck Act . . . were . . . limited . . . to ensur[ing] that federal officers and employees who reside or work within exclusive federal enclaves would be treated equally with those who reside and work outside such areas." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28, n. 8 (citing S. Rep. No. 1625, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 3 (1940)). As we conclude that the Public Salary Tax Act consents to Jefferson County's tax, we need not decide whether the Buck Act applies to this case.
10 Justice Breyer both recapitulates the reasoning of Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Howard and endeavors to distinguish the Court's decision in that case as involving "only [a] jurisdictional issue." Post, at 457 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). One of the two questions on which the Court granted certiorari in Howard, however, explicitly asked the Court to determine "[t]he validity of the Louisville occupational tax or license fee ordinance as applied to employees of the [Naval] Ordnance Plant." 344 U. S., at 625. The Court squarely held: "[T]he tax is valid." Id., at 629.
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