Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 22 (1999)

Page:   Index   Previous  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  Next

444

JEFFERSON COUNTY v. ACKER

Opinion of Scalia, J.

Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Souter, and Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

An officer of the federal courts may remove an action commenced against him in state court "for any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties." 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(3) (emphasis added). In my view, respondents have failed to show a " 'causal connection' between the charged conduct and asserted official authority," Willing-ham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 409 (1969). I therefore dissent from Part II of the Court's opinion.

Respondents read Ordinance No. 1120 as creating more than tax liability; in their view, the ordinance makes it unlawful to work if the tax goes unpaid. Building upon this reading, they assert that the county has sued them for performing their duties without a license, a complaint that would clearly establish the causal connection required by 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(3). This theory, however, is simply inconsistent with the complaints the county filed. It may perhaps be possible under Alabama law for the county to bring a misdemeanor prosecution against one who engages in a business or profession without having paid the required license fee; and the county may perhaps have a right to enjoin the conduct of a business or the practice of a profession when the license fee has not been paid. But no such action is before us here. Instead, the county has sued each of these respondents for refusing to pay the fee, as evidenced by the fact that the only relief it sought was the money due. See Complaints in Nos. DV9209643 and DV9209695 (Jefferson County District Court). When identifying, for purposes of § 1442(a)(3), what a suit is "for," it is necessary to focus, not on grounds of liability that the plaintiff could assert, but on the ground actually asserted. Regardless of whether Ordinance No. 1120 also purports to proscribe working without a license, these suits were only about respondents' refusal to pay the tax. That refusal is thus the act to which

Page:   Index   Previous  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007