Cite as: 528 U. S. 470 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
cation" has no application here. Post, at 491. According to Justice Souter, in Strickland we only rejected per se rules in order to respect the reasonable strategic choices made by lawyers, and that failing to consult about an appeal cannot be a strategic choice. Post, at 491-492. But we have consistently declined to impose mechanical rules on counsel— even when those rules might lead to better representation— not simply out of deference to counsel's strategic choices, but because "the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, . . . [but rather] simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." 466 U. S., at 689. The relevant question is not whether counsel's choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable. See id., at 688 (defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness). We expect that courts evaluating the reasonableness of counsel's performance using the inquiry we have described will find, in the vast majority of cases, that counsel had a duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal. We differ from Justice Souter only in that we refuse to make this determination as a per se (or "almost" per se) matter.
B
The second part of the Strickland test requires the defendant to show pre judice from counsel's deficient performance.
1
In most cases, a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves counsel's performance during the course of a legal proceeding, either at trial or on appeal. See, e. g., id., at 699 (claim that counsel made poor strategic choices regarding what to argue at a sentencing hearing); United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 649-650 (1984) (claim that young lawyer was incompetent to defend complex criminal
481
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