Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 16 (2000)

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Cite as: 528 U. S. 470 (2000)

Opinion of the Court

We believe this prejudice standard breaks no new ground, for it mirrors the prejudice inquiry applied in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52 (1985), and Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U. S. 327 (1969). In Hill, we considered an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's allegedly deficient advice regarding the consequences of entering a guilty plea. Like the decision whether to appeal, the decision whether to plead guilty (i. e., waive trial) rested with the defendant and, like this case, counsel's advice in Hill might have caused the defendant to forfeit a judicial proceeding to which he was otherwise entitled. We held that "to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement [of Strickland], the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, supra, at 59. Similarly, in Rodriquez, counsel failed to file a notice of appeal, despite being instructed by the defendant to do so. See 395 U. S., at 328. We held that the defendant, by instructing counsel to perfect an appeal, objectively indicated his intent to appeal and was entitled to a new appeal without any further showing. Because "[t]hose whose right to an appeal has been frustrated should be treated exactly like any other appellan[t]," we rejected any requirement that the would-be appellant "specify the points he would raise were his right to appeal reinstated." Id., at 330. See also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (1985) (defendant entitled to new appeal when counsel's deficient failure to comply with mechanistic local court rules led to dismissal of first appeal).

As with all applications of the Strickland test, the question whether a given defendant has made the requisite showing will turn on the facts of a particular case. See 466 U. S., at 695-696. Nonetheless, evidence that there were nonfrivolous grounds for appeal or that the defendant in question promptly expressed a desire to appeal will often be highly relevant in making this determination. We recognize that

485

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