Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Islands whose historical sufferings and status parallel those of the continental Native Americans.
Membership in a tribe, the majority suggests, rather than membership in a race or class of descendants, has been the sine qua non of governmental power in the realm of Indian law; Mancari itself, the majority contends, makes this proposition clear. Ante, at 519-520. But as scholars have often pointed out, tribal membership cannot be seen as the decisive factor in this Court's opinion upholding the BIA preferences in Mancari; the hiring preference at issue in that case not only extended to nontribal member Indians, it also required for eligibility that ethnic Native Americans possess a certain quantum of Indian blood.10 Indeed, the Federal Government simply has not been limited in its special dealings with the native peoples to laws affecting tribes or tribal Indians alone. See nn. 6, 7, supra. In light of this precedent, it is a painful irony indeed to conclude that native Hawaiians are not entitled to special benefits designed to restore a measure of native self-governance because they currently lack any vestigial native government—a possibility of which history and the actions of this Nation have deprived them.11
10 See, e. g., Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1754, 1761-1762 (1997). As is aptly explained, the BIA preference in that case was based on a statute that extended the preference to ethnic Indians—identified by blood quantum—who were not members of federally recognized tribes. 25 U. S. C. § 479. Only the implementing regulation included a mention of tribal membership, but even that regulation required that the tribal member also " 'be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood.' " Mancari, 417 U. S., at 553, n. 24.
11 Justice Breyer suggests that the OHA definition of native Hawaiians (i. e., Hawaiians who may vote under the OHA scheme) is too broad to be "reasonable." Ante, at 527 (opinion concurring in result). This suggestion does not identify a constitutional defect. The issue in this case is Congress' power to define who counts as an indigenous person, and Congress' power to delegate to States its special duty to persons so defined. (Justice Breyer's interest in tribal definitions of membership—and in
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