Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 4 (2000)

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4

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC.

Syllabus

her brief and regulations, the Secretary offers a legally permissible interpretation of the statute: that it permits a dissatisfied nursing home to have an administrative hearing on a determination that it has failed to comply substantially with the statute, agreements, or regulations, whether termination or some other remedy is imposed. See, e. g., Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843. The Secretary also denies that she engages in any practice that forces a home to submit a corrective plan and sacrifice appeal rights in order to avoid termination, or that penalizes more severely a home that chooses to appeal. Because the Council offers no convincing reason to doubt her description of the agency's practice, the Court need not decide whether a practice that forced homes to abandon legitimate challenges could amount to the practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review. If, as the Council argues, the regulations unlawfully limit the extent to which the agency will provide the administrative review channel leading to judicial review, its members remain free, after following the special review route, to contest in court the lawfulness of the relevant regulation or statute. That is true even if the agency does not or cannot resolve the particular contention, because it is the "action" arising under the Medicare Act that must be channeled through the agency. The Council finally argues that, as an association speaking on behalf of its injured members, it has no standing to take advantage of the special review channel. However, it is the members' rights to review that are at stake, and the statutes creating the special review channel adequately protect those rights. Pp. 20-24.

143 F. 3d 1072, reversed.

Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., post, p. 30, and Scalia, J., post, p. 31, filed dissenting opinions. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined except as to Part III, post, p. 32.

Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Barbara C. Biddle, Jeffrey Clair, Harriet S. Rabb, and Jeffrey Golland.

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