Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 27 (2000)

Page:   Index   Previous  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  Next

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

Petitioners do not contest these representations, but offer in response only that Pap's could very easily get back into the nude dancing business. The Court adopts petitioners' line, concluding that because respondent is still incorporated in Pennsylvania, it "could again decide to operate a nude dancing establishment in Erie." Ante, at 287. That plainly does not suffice under our cases. The test for mootness we have applied in voluntary-termination cases is not whether the action originally giving rise to the controversy could not conceivably reoccur, but whether it is "absolutely clear that the . . . behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc., 393 U. S. 199, 203 (1968) (emphasis added). Here I think that test is met. According to Panos' uncontested sworn affidavit, Pap's ceased doing business at Kandyland, and the premises were sold to an independent developer, in 1998— the year before the petition for certiorari in this case was filed. It strains credulity to suppose that the 72-year-old Mr. Panos shut down his going business after securing his victory in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and before the city's petition for certiorari was even filed, in order to increase his chances of preserving his judgment in the statistically unlikely event that a (not yet filed) petition might be granted. Given the timing of these events, given the fact that respondent has no existing interest in nude dancing (or in any other business), given Panos' sworn representation that he does not intend to invest—through Pap's or other-wise—in any nude dancing business, and given Panos' adment. The only fact mentioned by the Court to justify regarding it as perjurious is that respondent failed to raise mootness in its brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. That may be good basis for censure, but it is scant basis for suspicion of perjury—particularly since respondent, far from seeking to "insulate a favorable decision from review," ante, at 288, asks us in light of the mootness to vacate the judgment below. Reply to Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 5.

303

Page:   Index   Previous  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007