306
Scalia, J., concurring in judgment
of Art. III to adjudication of actual disputes between adverse parties," Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974), and that this limitation applies "at all stages of review," Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Which brings me to the Court's second reason for holding that this case is still alive: The Court concludes that because petitioners have an "ongoing injury" caused by the state court's invalidation of its duly enacted public nudity provision, our ability to hear the case and reverse the judgment below is itself "sufficient to prevent the case from being moot." Ante, at 288. Although the Court does not cite any authority for the proposition that the burden of an adverse decision below suffices to keep a case alive, it is evidently relying upon our decision in ASARCO, which held that Article III's standing requirements were satisfied on writ of certiorari to a state court even though there would have been no Article III standing for the action producing the state judgment on which certiorari was sought. We assumed jurisdiction in the case because we concluded that the party seeking to invoke the federal judicial power had standing to challenge the adverse judgment entered against them by the state court. Because that judgment, if left undisturbed, would "caus[e] direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for our review," ASARCO, 490 U. S., at 623-624, and because a decision by this Court to reverse the State Supreme Court would clearly redress that injury, we concluded that the original plaintiffs' lack of standing was not fatal to our jurisdiction, id., at 624.
I dissented on this point in ASARCO, see id., at 634 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Scalia, J.), and remain of the view that it was incorrectly decided. But ASARCO at least did not purport to hold that the constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability may be satisfied solely by
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