Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)
Thomas, J., dissenting
been activated by such a "challeng[e] to the validity of the Secretary's . . . regulatio[n]." 476 U. S., at 680.9
But it is one thing to conclude that the result in Ringer would have been different had we applied Michigan Academy's § 1395ii analysis to that case; it is quite another to declare that Michigan Academy effected a sub silentio overruling of Ringer. Contrary to the majority's representation, ante, at 18, my approach entails only the former, and therefore does not offend stare decisis principles as a sub silentio overruling would. As noted, supra, at 35, our opinion in Ringer did not expressly decide the meaning of § 1395ii, assuming instead (as the parties had done) that § 1395ii functions as a garden variety incorporating reference, i. e., that § 1395ii incorporates § 405(h) in every case involving the Medicare Act. Accordingly, "[t]he most that can be said is that the point was in the cas[e] if anyone had seen fit to raise it. Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents." Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511 (1925). See also, e. g., Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U. S. 266, 281 (1999) ("[T]his Court is not bound by its prior assumptions"); United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S. 33, 38 (1952). In other words, Michigan Academy could not have overruled Ringer (sub silentio or otherwise) on a
9 While I readily agree with the majority's observation that my reading of Michigan Academy implies a different result in Ringer, I fail to comprehend the majority's assertion that my view of Michigan Academy also implies a different result in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). See ante, at 18-19. As noted, supra, at 34, Salfi was a Social Security case, and so § 405(h) applied of its own force.
Our post-Michigan Academy cases are entirely consistent with my reading of Michigan Academy. For example, in Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U. S. 449 (1999), the challenge was directed to a particular determination of reimbursement benefits, and we held that § 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act by § 1395ii, precluded resort to general federal-question jurisdiction.
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