38
TERM CARE, INC. Thomas, J., dissenting
ity of the Secretary's instructions and regulations" would not. 476 U. S., at 680.
This dichotomy does not translate exactly to the instant case, the majority tells us, because the Secretary's determination to terminate a nursing home's provider agreement, see 42 U. S. C. § 1395cc(b) (1994 ed. and Supp. III), in no sense resembles the determination of an "amount" of an individual's benefits under Part A or B, see § 1395ff. Therefore, the majority concludes, Michigan Academy's interpretation of § 1395ii simply does not bear on respondent's challenge to the Secretary's regulations here. See ante, at 20.
But § 1395ii applies to more than just § 1395ff, the provision concerning benefit amounts; it applies, rather, to the entire Medicare Act, including § 1395cc, the provision concerning provider agreements that is directly at issue here. And we have "stron[g] cause to construe a single formulation . . . the same way each time it is called into play." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 143 (1994). Accordingly, the interpretation of § 1395ii that we announced in Michigan Academy must have a more general import than a distinction between Part B benefits determinations, on the one hand, and Part B methods guiding such determinations, on the other. Michigan Academy must have established a distinction between, on the one hand, a dispute over any particularized determination and, on the other hand, a "challeng[e] to the validity of the Secretary's instructions and regulations," 476 U. S., at 680.7 The former triggers § 1395ii's incorporation of § 405(h); the latter does not.
This case obviously falls into the latter category. Respondent in no way disputes any particularized determina-7 For this reason, it is beside the point that Congress amended § 1395ff after Michigan Academy to make express provision for administrative and judicial review of Part B benefits claims. See Pub. L. 99-509, § 9341(a)(1)(B), 100 Stat. 2037. Congress has not substantively amended § 1395ii since Michigan Academy, and so Michigan Academy's gloss on § 1395ii deserves as much stare decisis respect today as it ever has.
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