Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 32 (2000)

Page:   Index   Previous  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  Next

32

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC.

Thomas, J., dissenting

of that vote: I am doubtful whether Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667 (1986), was correctly decided, but that case being on the books, and involving as it does a question of statutory interpretation, I believe it requires affirmance here. There is in my view neither any basis for holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1395ii has a different meaning with regard to Part A than with regard to Part B, nor (since repeals by implication are disfavored) any basis for holding that the subsequent addition of a judicial-review provision distantly related to § 1395ii altered the meaning we had authoritatively pronounced. See post, at 38, n. 7 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

I do not join Part III of Justice Thomas's opinion because its reliance upon what it calls the presumption of pre-enforcement review suggests that Michigan Academy was (a fortiori) correctly decided. I might have thought, as an original matter, that the categorical language of §§ 1395ii and 405(h) overcame even what Justice Thomas acknowledges is the stronger presumption of some judicial review. See post, at 45. With regard to the timing of review, I would not even use the word "presumption" (a term which Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967), applies only to the preference for judicial review at some point, see id., at 140), since that suggests that some unusually clear statement is required by way of negation. In my view, preenforcement review is better described as the background rule, which can be displaced by any reasonable implication ("persuasive reason to believe," as Abbott Laboratories put it, ibid.) from the statute.

Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy join, and with whom Justice Scalia joins except as to Part III, dissenting.

Unlike the majority, I take no position on how 42 U. S. C. § 405(h) applies to respondent's suit. That section is beside the point in this case because it does not apply of its own

Page:   Index   Previous  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007