30
Stevens, J., dissenting
No action against the United States, the Commissioner of Social Security, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter."
42 U. S. C. § 1395ii provides:
"The provisions of sections 406 and 416( j) of this title, and of subsections (a), (d), (e), (h), (i), ( j), (k), and (l) of section 405 of this title, shall also apply with respect to this subchapter to the same extent as they are applicable with respect to subchapter II of this chapter, except that, in applying such provisions with respect to this subchapter, any reference therein to the Commissioner of Social Security or the Social Security Administration shall be considered a reference to the Secretary or the Department of Health and Human Services, respectively."
28 U. S. C. § 1331 provides:
"Federal question. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
While I join Justice Thomas' lucid dissent without qualification, I think it worthwhile to identify a significant distinction between cases like Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), and Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602 (1984), on the one hand, and cases like Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667 (1986), and this case, on the other hand. In the former group, the issue concerned the plaintiffs' entitlement to benefits; in the latter two, the issue concerns providers' eligibility for reimbursement. The distinction between those two types of issues mirrors a critical distinction between the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405, and the Medicare Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1395ii.
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