Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 58 (2000)

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570

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

That is a plausible reading of Collins, and I might well be prepared to accept it, were the issue presented here. But it is not. For purposes of this case, it does not matter whether Collins eliminated the fourth Calder category or left it undisturbed. For even if the fourth category remains viable, our precedents make clear that it cannot be stretched to fit the statutory change at issue here. Those precedents— decisions that fully acknowledged the fourth Calder category—firmly establish that retroactively applied changes in rules concerning the admissibility of evidence and the competency of witnesses do not raise Ex Post Facto Clause concerns.

In Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380 (1898), this Court upheld against ex post facto attack the retroactive application of a statute that permitted the introduction of previously inadmissible evidence to demonstrate the authenticity of disputed writings. The new statute, the Court reasoned, "did nothing more than remove an obstacle arising out of a rule of evidence that withdrew from the consideration of the jury testimony which, in the opinion of the legislature, tended to elucidate the ultimate, essential fact to be established, namely, the guilt of the accused." Id., at 387.

The case most similar to the one before us is Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884). In that case, a statute in effect at the time of the offense but repealed by the time of trial provided that felons were incompetent to testify. The defendant, whose conviction for capital murder had been based in large part on the testimony of a felon, claimed that the application of the new law to his trial was ex post facto. The Court rejected the defendant's claim, adopting reasoning applicable to the instant case:

"Statutes which simply enlarge the class of persons who may be competent to testify in criminal cases are not ex post facto in their application to prosecutions for crimes committed prior to their passage; for they do

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