Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 54 (2000)

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566

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

of such an evidentiary rule does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

II

The Ex Post Facto Clause, this Court has said repeatedly, furthers two important purposes. First, it serves "to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 28-29 (1981).11

Second, it "restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 29; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 267 (1994); Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423, 429-430 (1987). The latter purpose has much to do with the separation of powers; like its textual and conceptual neighbor the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause aims to ensure that legislatures do not meddle with the judiciary's task of adjudicating guilt and innocence in individual cases. Weaver, 450 U. S., at 29, n. 10.

The Court does not even attempt to justify its extension of the Clause in terms of these two fundamental purposes. That is understandable, for today's decision serves neither purpose. The first purpose (fair warning and reliance), vital as it is, cannot tenably be relied upon by Carmell. He had ample notice that the conduct in which he engaged was illegal. He certainly cannot claim to have relied in any way on the preamendment version of Article 38.07: He tendered

11 Today's opinion apart, see ante, at 531, n. 21, this Court has consistently stressed " 'lack of fair notice' " as one of the "central concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause." Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433, 441 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 30 (1981)). See also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 266-267 (1994); Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423, 430 (1987); Weaver, 450 U. S., at 28-29; Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 191-192 (1977). The implausibility of ex ante reliance on rules of admissibility like the one at issue here helps explain why the Ex Post Facto Clause has never been held to apply to changes in such rules.

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