Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
tion; neither should Texas." Id., at 14. The historical development of Article 38.07 reveals a progressive alleviation of restrictions on the competency of victim testimony, not a legislative emphasis on the quantum of evidence needed to convict.
The version of Article 38.07 applied at Carmell's trial was thus, in both effect and purpose, an evidentiary rule governing the weight that may be given to the testimony of sexual assault victims who had attained the age of 14. The Court's efforts to paint it as something more than that are detached from the statute's moorings and are consequently unpersuasive.
To begin with, it is beyond doubt that Article 38.07 does not establish an element of the offense. See Love v. State, 499 S. W. 2d 108, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ("[O]utcry is not one of the elements of the offense charged."). To convict a defendant of sexual assault in Texas today as before 1993, the prosecution need not introduce the victim's testimony at all, much less any corroboration of that testimony. The Court is therefore less than correct in asserting that "[u]nder the law in effect at the time the acts were committed, the prosecution's case was legally insufficient and petitioner was entitled to a judgment of acquittal, unless the State could produce both the victim's testimony and corroborative evidence." Ante, at 530. Under both the old and new versions of the statute, a conviction could be sustained on the testimony of a single third-party witness, on purely circumstantial evidence, or in any number of other ways—so long as the admissible evidence presented is sufficient to prove all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.4 And under either version of Article 38.07, of course,
4 Not only is corroborated victim testimony not necessary for a conviction under the former version of Article 38.07, it is not always sufficient. Under both the old and new versions of the statute, the prosecution's evidence will not support a conviction unless it is adequate to prove all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
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