Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 43 (2000)

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

tinues in force for victims aged 18 or older, with a modified definition of outcry not material here. Thus, under the version of Article 38.07 in effect at the time of Carmell's trial but not the version in effect at the time of the offense, his conviction was supportable by the uncorroborated testimony of K. M. The new version of Article 38.07 was applied at Carmell's trial, and he was convicted.2 Carmell argues that the application of the new version of Article 38.07 to his trial violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1.

I

A proper understanding of Article 38.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is central to this case. Accordingly, I turn first to the effect and purpose of that statute.

The effect of Article 38.07 in sexual offense prosecutions is plain. If the victim is of a certain age, the jury, in assessing whether the prosecution has met its burden of demonstrating guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, must give no weight to her testimony unless that testimony is corroborated, either by other evidence going directly to guilt or by "outcry." 3 For victims (such as K. M.) who were between the ages of 14 and

2 The Texas Court of Appeals did not rule on whether the State in fact did corroborate K. M.'s testimony at trial. I note the testimony of K. M.'s mother that when she visited Carmell in jail and told him he needed to confess if he was sorry for what he had done, he wrote " 'adultery with [K. M.]' " on a piece of paper. 963 S. W. 2d 833, 835 (Tex. App. 1998). That testimony might count as corroboration. Because this question is outside the grant of certiorari, I (like the Court, see ante, at 519, n. 4) do not further address it.

3 At first glance one might object that the statute permits the jury to give such testimony some weight, just not enough to support a conviction. See, e. g., ante, at 546, n. 33 (contending that under the old Article 38.07, "the victim's testimony alone is not inadmissible, it is just insufficient"). A moment's reflection should reveal, however, that this distinction is illusory. If a particular item of evidence cannot by itself support a conviction, then the jury will not be permitted to consider it unless and until corroborating evidence is introduced.

555

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